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Active v. Passive
Euthanasia: Why
l(eep the Distinction?
Yale Kamisar

I

n the past two decades, we have
witnessed a "sea change in public, medical, and legislative judgments" about "letting die" and
the "right to die." 1 But it is no less true
today than it was 35 years ago, when I
first wrote about this subject, that in
Anglo-American jurisprudence active
euthanasia (what used to be called
"mercy killing") is murder. 2
So far as the law on the books is concerned, it matters not that one who intentionally kills another human being
"does so at the victim's request" or that
"his motive is the worthy one of terminating the victim's sufferings from an incurable and painful disease." 3 As one
commentator recently explained it, "So
great a value is put on life that a person
may not waive his right to life; killing
does not become nonculpable because
the victim consented." 4
But all this may change in the near
future. As one of the nation's most
forceful and eloquent opponents of active euthanasia, the University of Chicago's Leon Kass, observed several years
ago, "So-called active euthanasia practiced by physicians seems to be an idea
whose time has come." 5
Not a few would say that Kass exaggerated the potency of the assault on the
long-standing prohibition against "direct" or "active" euthanasia. After all,
although most forecasters predicted in
Yale Kamisar is the Clarence Danvw Distinguished University Professor ofLaw at the
University of Michigan.
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1991 that Washington state would be- Rochester, New York, doctor who is also
come the first jurisdiction in the West- a member of the University of Rochesern world to legalize active euthanasia, ter Medical School faculty. Quill was
Initiative 119 (euphemistically called the neither indicted nor disciplined by med"death with dignity" or "aid in dying" ical authorities for prescribing enough
referendum) went down to defeat. And barbiturates to enable a long-standing
last November, although once again patient to commit suicide following her
early polls indicated overwhelming sup- refusal of treatment for a severe type of
port for a similar proposal in California leukemia. 8
The response to Quill's action and to
(Proposition 161), it, too, failed.
At first blush, these political setbacks the article he wrote in a medical journal
for the active euthanasia movement spelling out what he had done and why
seem fairly decisive. But I think not; has been "very positive" and has "moved
they can be explained away or at least public discussion away from the suicide
minimized. I believe that Kass's con- machine." 9 Many who were jolted, or
cerns are as well founded today as when at least greatly troubled, by Kevorkian's
actions supported QuilJ.I 0
he first voiced them in 1989.
Although last November California
Jack Kevorkian, the Michigan pathologist who practices as well as preaches voters defeated Proposition 161 by a 54
assisted suicide, may have significantly percent to 46 percent margin, support
affected the outcome in Washington. for the measure was impressive-conLess than two weeks before voters went sidering that a coalition oflOO organizato the polls, Kevorkian used his "sui- tions (including the Roman Catholic
cide" machine twice in one night. From Church, the California Medical Associathat point on, according to a spokesper- tion, and the California Nurses Associason for the Hemlock Society in Seattle, tion) fought the proposal, nearly every
voter support for the "aid-in-dying" major newspaper in the state editorialmeasure fell dramatically. 6 At the very ized against it, and opponents of the
moment Kevorkian swung into action, proposition outspent proponents by a
a TV blitz against the measure hit the margin of at least 3 to l. 11
Moreover, opponents ofProposition
airwaves, and "Jack Kevorkian put a face
on [people's] fear." 7
161 did not frontally attack the basic noBut proponents of assisted suicide and tion embodied in the measure as much
active euthanasia have distanced them- as they raised fears that it lacked adeselves from Kevorkian, noting that the quate protections. 12 They pointed out
women whose deaths he assisted were that
not his patients and not terminally ill.
~ although the initial directive had
They point instead to the "aid-in- to be witnessed by two people not
dying" performed by Timothy Quill, a linked financially with the patient, no
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Dr. Jack Kevorkian and his 'suicide' machine

witnesses were mandated at the time of
the actual request for and implementation of euthanasia;
~ although an "enduring request"
by a qualified patient was required, it
was simply defined as one "expressed on
more than one occasion" (perhaps only
a day or several hours apart);
~ there was no required "waiting period" after a patient decided to seek
help in dying; and
~ the proposal did not require a psychiatric evaluation to rule out treatable
depression as a basis for the request. 13

Public Acceptance
Most opponents of Proposition 161
hammered away at its inadequate safeguards rather than its basic idea probably because they were well aware that
"the marked increase in public acceptance of killing terminally ill patients
... has been striking." 14 According to
public opinion polls, not only does a
large majority of U.S. citizens now support Jaws allowing terminally ill patients
to refuse or stop life-sustaining treatment, 15 but many Americans now favor

active euthanasia for incurable and comatose patients. 16
According to a close observer of the
Proposition 161 contest, "The ranks of
those voting no swelled as the opposition coalition focused its advertising
during the final weeks on what worked
a year earlier to bring down a similar
measure in Washington state by a nearly
identical margin (54-46): voters' fears
that mistakes would be madc." 17 But
only six months before Proposition 161
went down to defeat, surveys showed
that 75 percent of California voters supported the basic idea of physician aidin-dying, 54 percent strongly so. 18
Thus, Alexander Morgan Capron, the
former executive director of the President's Commission for the Study of
Ethical Problems in Medicine and Behavioral Research, now professor oflaw
and medicine at the University of Southern California, had good reason to issue
the following warning:
Proposition l6l's defeat should not
obscure the remarkable fact that millions of people arc so fearful of how
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thev think thev'll be treated bv the
health care svst~m when thev're ven·
ill that thev;d rather be de;d .... ·
Average p~ople are . . . so dismayed
at how death occurs in this countn'
and so distrustful of physicians' abili~·
or willingness to give them a "good
death" that they will consider overturning thousands of years of medical
ethics and societal prohibitions to legalize direct killing by physicians.'9

I noted earlier that Leon Kass observed
recently that active euthanasia appears
to be "an idea whose time has come." 20
But he was quick to add, "In my view,
it is a bad idea whose time must not
come-not no,v, not ever." 21
I agree. I was pleased when Washington's Initiative 119 went down to defeat
in 1991 and when California's Proposition 161 met a similar fate last vear.
But proponents of these measu'res arc
not easily discouraged. They can be expected to try again (perhaps in Oregon
or Florida or in Washington a second
time) with more finely honed versions
of the measures that failed. And I share
Professor Capron's concern that unless
33

health care providers who oppose active
euthanasia "change those aspects of the
system that make a quick death such an
attractive alternative, support for legalizing euthanasia is sure to build and eventually to prevail."22
In resisting the active euthanasia movement in the years ahead I shall be aligned
with, and rooting for, Capron, Kass,
and such other well-known commentators and spokespersons as Daniel Callahan, Arthur Caplan, Albert Jansen,
John Pickering, and Susan Wolf. 23 But
the law and politics of euthanasia make
strange bedfellows. My anti-active-euthanasia confreres are favorably disposed
toward, or at least willing to accept,
what used to be called, and I still call,
passive euthanasia-a practice that has
gained wide acceptance. But I have always been greatly troubled by it.
r have reexamined the earlier writings
of my "allies" and read their most recent contributions to the literature. 24
Insofar as they maintain that individual
acts of "direct" or "positive" or "active" euthanasia are fundamentally different from the "passive" or "negative"
variety-that the former is unacceptable
or intrinsically immoral while the latter
is permissible-I find many of their arguments unpersuasive and none of them
convincing.
As Dean Guido Calabresi ofYale Law
School has pointed out, when we have
to make "tragic choices" -choices that
confront us when fundamental beliefs
clash-"we look for solutions which
seek to cover the difficulty and thereby
permit us to assert that we are cleaving
to both beliefS in conflict." 25 A good example is how we have dealt with death,
dying, and euthanasia.
Beliefs in Conflict
Two sets of beliefs are in conflict. On
the one hand, we want to respect patients' wishes, relieve suffering, and put
an end to excessively burdensome and
seemingly futile medical treatment. On
the other hand, we shrink ·from the
concept of a life not worth living. We
want to affirm the supreme value of life.
We want to maintain the salutary principle that the law protects all human life,
no matter how miserable a person appears or how worthless she happens to
feel.
In short, we want it both ways. The
two sets of beliefs are in conflict, or at
least in great tension, but somehow we
cling to both. 26
We say all human life is inviolate, but
34

we do not always mean it. We make
"quality of life" judgments, but we
deny it. We practice a kind of euthanasia
in a soft light, subdued by history, but
we would rather not examine this practice in the bright spotlight of utmost
analytic clarity.
As I see it, the purpose of the distinction between "direct killing" and "letting die" is not (as some claim) to separate deaths caused by human action
from those caused by the processes
of nature. Nor (as others claim) is it to
separate intrinsically immoral practices
from permissible ones. Rather, the purpose of the distinction-or at least its

Many physicians fail to use
means that are now
available to relieve
virtually all pain.

effect-is to have it both ways.
For a long time we have had it both
ways. In the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960sas the many fuilures to indict, acquittals,
and suspended sentences attest-when
"mercy killing" occurred, the law in action was "as malleable as the law on the
books [was] uncompromising." 27
In the 1970s the distinction between
"extraordinary" (or "heroic") and "ordinary" medical treatment proved serviceable. 28 Although the terms are so
spongy and were used so loosely that
the distinction is now widely rejected,
in its time this distinction, too, mediated or obscured the conflict between
our two sets of beliefS.
Calling a life-sustaining medical procedure extraordinary was more an expression of the conclusion that the procedure could ethically be discontinued
than it was a justification for doing so.
But the terminology reassured the public that "only certain kinds of lifesaving
measures could be, and would be, terminated; that disconnecting an unconscious patient's respirator in some vague
way only constitutes a 'slight deviation'
from our official morality." 2 9
The extraordinary/ordinary distinction
has not fared well in the law of death
and dying. Another distinction, one
also rooted in Roman Catholic tradition, has proved to have much greater
staying power-the distinction between
killing and letting die.
Interestingly, an increasing number of
TRIAL MARCH 1993

those who defend the distinction are so
determined to keep a chasm between
the two practices that they insist that
the withholding or withdrawal of lifesustaining measures is not passive euthanasia or any other kind of euthanasia and that to use the "E" word in
this· context only causes confusion. 30
(I would say rather that it causes, and
ought to cause, concern.)
But I think one of the leading proponents of euthanasia (both active and
passive), the renowned British legal
scholar Glanville Williams, had it right
when, 20 years ago, he said,
A toehold for euthanasia is provided
by the practice ofletting die, or what
is now called passive euthanasia ....
If this distinction between an act and
an omission is thought to be artificial,
its artificiality is imposed on us by our
refusal to accord the same moral freedom for action as we do for inaction.
Pending a change of thought, the
concept of an omission is a useful
way of freeing us from some of the
consequences of overrigid moral
attitudes. 31

I have no doubt that Alex Capron,
Daniel Callahan, Leon Kass, and other
opponents of active euthanasia draw the
line at letting die as a matter of principle. They support the "right to die,"
but strongly resist direct killing.
Many others, however, have never
been happy with this distinction. They
were willing to draw the line between
letting die and active euthanasia not as
a matter of principle but only as a matter of tactics. I count among them the
two leading euthanasia proponents of
our time-Glanville Williams and the
late Joseph Fletcher, the prominent
medical ethicist.
For them, the distinction was a serviceable one because it afforded the
physician and the patient's fumily much
more room to maneuver than would be
possible if one had to proceed by lethal
injection-and it gave the rest of us, or
most of the rest of us, less cause for
alarm. But these people were always
committed to the realization of active
euthanasia. For them, acceptance of the
"right to die" was only a partial victory
-a stopgap measure. 32
They are no longer content to have
it both ways. They are not, and never
were, satisfied with euthanasia in a soft
light, subdued by history; they also
want it in a bright spotlight.
At a euthanasia conference held nearly
two decades ago, Fletcher maintained

that there is no real difference between
letting die and active euthanasia: "A
deliberate act of omission, when death
is the goal or purpose or end sought,
is morally the same [as] a deliberate act
of commission.' ' 33 He argued that doctors ought to engage in both forms of
euthanasia.
Fletcher's views disturbed some who
attended the conference. Another speaker warned that since some do not clearly
distinguish between active and passive
euthanasia and "since active euthanasia
is morally repugnant to so many . . .
this confusion has led many physicians
to avoid the use of the very desirable,
accepted passive form." 34 According to
this speaker, the distinction between the
two forms of euthanasia had to be maintained "so that physicians will continue
and in fact increase their use of this ageold passive form" and "to insure that
passive euthanasia not be tainted in
any way by the active euthanasia
movement." 35
Fletcher gave this response: ''Though
the alleged difference between [passive
and active euthanasia] is not a real one
ethically or philosophically or theologically regarded, it is arguably possible to
separate them for pragmatic reasons of

prudence and workability."36
they see it, the time has come to upset
Since that conference was held, doc- the compromise between letting die and
tors have greatly increased their use of direct killing. The time has come to
the "age-old passive form" of euthana- move on to the next stage of euthanasia.
sia. Negative or passive euthanasia-even
removal of the feeding tube-is now a Compromise Position
fait accompli in modern medicine. That
"It is one thing to justify an act; it
battle is over. And there is now more is another to justify a general practice." 37
support for active euthanasia than there Thus, those who can imagine individual
ever has been-and I fear that that sup- circumstances where active euthanasia
would be hard to condemn (and I certainly can) may still oppose legislation
authorizing the practice. We may do so,
~ say all human life is
as Rutgers Law School's Norman Caninviolate~ but we do not
tor has argued, on the ground that
always mean it.
"such a radical alteration" in the legal
framework surrounding gravely ill patients "ought not to be instituted unless
it is absolutely essential" 38-and no such
port will grow even stronger.
Fletcher is no longer with us, but his showing has been made.
The reasons laypeoplc most often give
allies and his followers are, and they are
making their presence felt. They no for supporting active euthanasia are that
longer feel the need to separate active it is inhumane to make patients suffer
euthanasia from the passive variety for from intractable pain or that it is inpragmatic reasons. Passive euthanasia is humane to keep them biologically alive
now so well established that people of when they seem to have "no life to
Fletcher's persuasion are no longer con- live." But many physicians fail to use
cerned that it will be "tainted" by the means that are now available to relieve
virtually all pain.3 9 And though adactive euthanasia movement.
Proponents of active euthanasia are in vances in medical technology have made
a strong position, and they know it. As it possible, as one commentator has put
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it, to extend existence beyond all "natural bounds," physicians, patients, and
fumilies have learned how to resist medical procedures this commentator calls
"merely burdensome or degrading
medical additions to the unhappy end
of a life." 40
I have been an active participant in
the euthanasia debate, but I have also
tried to be an objective observer of
developments. I am not enamored of
the distinction many have drawn between terminating life support and resorting to external death-causing agents,
but I have to recognize that this distinction has become an integral part of
the medicolegal landscape.
This is not the conclusion I would
have arrived at, but it seems to be the
compromise position our society has
reached in the struggle to preserve as
many traditional restraints against killing
as we can consistent with taking a humane approach toward seriously ill patients. This is not the way I would have
liked to resolve the controversy, and I
very much doubt that it is the way most
logicians or philosophers would resolve
it-but it may nevertheless be a pragmatic and defensible way to do so. D
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8
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Q. What
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Sixth in a series

Historically the favorite asset for funding structured
settlements has been an annuity (sometimes called a
•
"settlement annuity") issued by a life insurer. This type
of annuity is unlike other annuities in some respects; for
example, a plaintiff cannot own one.
Recently U.S. Treasury bonds gained in popularity as funding
assets, due mainly to 1988 tax legislation. IRC §130 was amended
to permit the plaintiff to have a security interest in the funding
asset(s) in an assigned structure.

A

Settlement annuities still have the dominant market share. Tort
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to annuities which will pay as long as the plaintiff lives); usually
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remaining players (with an exception or two), retained high ratings,
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climates the yield on a bond structure will about match the yield on a
settlement annuity, but more often the settlement annuity will have a
bt>.tter yield. A structure funded by either asset will offer tax-free
financial performance which, as to the conservative part of his or
her portfolio, only the unusually fortunate plaintiff could match by
investing an all-cash settlement.
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